Estimates of the demand for money provide important foundations for monetary policy setting but if the estimation technique does not explicitly account for structural changes then such estimates will be biased. This paper presents an investigation into the level and stability of money demand (M1) for Australia and New Zealand over the 1960-2009 period and demonstrates that both countries experienced regime shifts; Australia also experienced an intercept shift. Application of four time series methods provide consistent results with 1984 and 1998 break dates. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ stability tests reveal that M1 demand functions were unstable over the 1984 to 1998 period for both countries although tests for stability are not rejected thereafter.
Introduction
Empirical analyses of money demand continue with renewed vigor in spite of some established stylized facts concerning income and interest rate elasticities. For advanced countries it is argued that financial reforms introduced in the early 1970s had significant effects on money demand functions and that disequilibrium in money demand functions influenced the effectiveness of interest rate policies in the long run, albeit through its effects on inflation and the output gap. These reforms and the increased use of money substitutes for transactions (e.g. credit/debit cards and electronic money transfers) are argued to have increased competition in financial markets and enhanced international capital mobility. Scale economies in money demand within and across economies may have reduced income elasticities while the contemporaneous utilisation of market based interest rate policies may have improved the rate of interest elasticity.
The choice of monetary policy instrument is crucial; using the incorrect instrument will cause income instability. Deadman and Ghatak (1981) postulated that a stable money demand function is an important issue because it provides a reliable and predictable link between changes in monetary aggregates and changes in variables included in the money demand function. Similarly, Poole (1970) argued that the stability aspect of money demand is vital for selecting monetary policy instruments. Explicitly, Poole used IS-LM analysis to show that the money supply (rate of interest) should be targeted if money demand is stable (unstable).
However, even in conditions of stable money demand, many central banks seem to be attracted to targeting the rate of interest following the Taylor rule (see Taylor, 1999) . The rationale behind this perspective lies in the belief that adjusting the lagged short term interest rate increases the ability of central banks to influence income and thence central banks now pay less attention to the stability of money demand functions.
Interest rate targeting is a monetary policy framework employed in Australia and New Zealand to stabilize inflation, and such policy selection may be based on either the Taylor rule or a belief that money demand functions are unstable. Although it appears that they have been relatively successful in achieving price stability, their policies have guaranteed neither balanced growth nor macroeconomic stability; this may be due to the added complexities attributable to the liberalization of their financial markets in the 1980s. Financial market liberalization may have caused some instability in the demand for money function which would mean that rate of interest targeting would be the appropriate policy option for central banks. However, reforms and external shocks may have distorted the equilibrium relationship of money demand, and this raises doubts about the validity of studies on money demand that do not utilize structural break estimation methods.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the stability of money demand (M1) relationship for Australia and New Zealand over the 1960-2009 period while accounting explicitly for structural changes that might have occurred during the period. We apply i) Lee and Strazicich's (2003) unit root test to test for non-stationarity of the series in the presence of two structural breaks, ii) Gregory and Hansen's (1996a & b) single endogenous break test to test for cointegration among the variables and to estimate the cointegrating equations. Standard time series techniques of iii) Hendry's General to Specific (GETS), iv) Engle and Granger's (1987) two step method (EG), v) Phillip and 4 Georgopoulos (2000) . 2 In spite of the large variation in income elasticity estimates the aforementioned studies either implicitly or explicitly support central banks' monetary targeting regimes.
However, efforts by Bahmani-Oskooee and Chomsisengphet (2002) suggest that money demand is not universally stable. They assessed the stability of M2 demand for 11 OECD countries and obtained a range of income elasticities between 0.6 and an implausibly high 3.9. Although their findings indicate that money demand is stable in Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden and USA they also suggest some instability of M2 for Switzerland and the UK. Obtaining evidence against the stability of money demand suggests that interest rate targeting is optimal.
Corroborating evidence for money demand instability is not unheard of. For Canada, both McPhail (1991) and Haug (1999) asserted that the openness of financial systems had made significant impacts on broader monetary aggregates and therefore support interest rate targeting. Similarly, Nagayasu (2003) obtained a near-unit income elasticity estimate of M2 demand for Japan over the 1958-2000 period and, through application of Hansen's (1992) stability tests, revealed that M2 demand is unstable. Papadopoulos and Zis (1997) investigated the determinants and the stability of money demand (M1, M2 and M3) for Greece. Although they find that M2 and M3 are largely stable, they also obtain results which suggest that M1 demand is unstable; this corroborates earlier findings of Sharma (1994) . In a study of the Spanish economy, Vega (1998) finds that a structural break, which may capture changes in the openness of the financial system, has affected the stability of broad money. This leads Vega (1998) to suggest that it is reasonable to use the rate of interest to curtail inflation rates. 3 Other recent studies, such as Coenen and Vega (2001) , Bruggeman et al. (2003) , Brand and Cassola (2004) , Beyer (2009) and Belke and Czudaj (2010) all provide useful inferences on the Euro Area money demand and monetary policy.
The case of Australia
The pioneering study by Cohen and Norton (1969) implied stability in narrow and broad measures of money. Their study was replicated and augmented by others for various monetary aggregates. Corroborating evidence was provided by Sharpe and Volker (1977) and Pagan and Volker (1981) who found limited instability in money demand functions. Hoque and Al-Mutairi (1996) investigated the long run relationship between M1 and its determinants (income, interest rate and price level) over the 1970-1993 period and found no instability in M1 demand despite the countenance of financial innovation and deregulation. Valadkhani (2005) examined the determinants of M2 demand over the 1976-2002 period and found it to be cointegrated with real income, the rate of return on 10-year Treasury bonds, and cash and inflation rates, with an income elasticity of M2 demand close to unity. Felmingham and Zhang (2001) examined M2 demand over the 2 Other studies that found no evidence of instability in money demand functions include Hayo (2000) for Austria, Juselius (1998) for Denmark, Nielson et al. (2004) for Italy, Bahmani-Oskooee and Economidou (2005) for Greece, Gerlach-Kristen (2001) for Switzerland, and Nielsen (2004) and Escribano (2004) for the UK.
5 1976-1998 period and found it to be stable subject to a regime shift occurring during the 1991 recession, which supported earlier findings by Lim and Martin (1991) , Juselius and Hargreaves (1992) , Lim (1995) and Asano (1999) . However, Felmingham and Zhang (2001) attained an implausibly high income elasticity of 1.2; a much lower income elasticity is expected due to increased financial efficiencies and scale economies in money demand.
Sets of empirical results that question the stability of money demand in Australia include Felmingham and Zhang (2001) , who found some instability in the 1990s, and Adams and Porter (1976) and Blundell-Wignall and Thorp (1987) who both provided evidence that led them to argue against the stability of narrow and broad monetary aggregates. Orden and Fisher (1993) examined the dynamic impacts of financial deregulation on M3 demand over the 1965-1989 period and found a cointegrating relationship between real M3 and prices and output series prior to the financial liberalization; however they did not support cointegration between M3 demand and its price and output determinants either over the full sample or after financial liberalization, and this implies instability in the M3 demand function over the entire period and especially subsequent to 1982.
The case of New Zealand
There is a dearth of empirical studies on money demand for New Zealand and the stability of her various monetary aggregates is yet to be determined. Orden and Fisher (1993) found some instability of money demand in Australia; however their results for New Zealand are different as they found stability over the whole and sub-periods. Siklos (1995a Siklos ( , 1995b examined the cointegrating links between M3, expected inflation and short term interest rates (the difference between NZ and US rates) over the [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] period and attained implausibly high income elasticities varying between 2 to 6. The income elasticities attained by Choi and Oxley (2004) and Valadkhani (2002) also seem unexpectedly high at around 1.7 and 1.5, respectively. An income elasticity estimate that is more in line with expectations was provided by Razzak (2001) who found the income elasticity of monetary base to be around unity over the 1988-1997 period while asserting that the correlation between money and real output is stronger than that between money and inflation.
Empirical issues
Given that a number of major financial reforms were implemented by Australia and New Zealand since the 1960s to enhance the efficiency of their financial sectors, it is entirely plausible that structural changes in their money demand may have occurred. Moreover, other events that influenced their domestic economies (such as natural disasters, oil price shocks and financial crises, etc.) may be associated with structural changes in the data series also. The failure to accommodate structural changes in the data series and cointegrating vectors could result in the attainment of misleading results.
Although the aforementioned Australia and New Zealand studies offer important insight on monetary policy procedures, their empirical results are neither mutually supportive nor equivocal. Furthermore, with the notable exception of Felmingham and 6 Zhang (2001) for Australia (albeit with an implausibly high income elasticity), most studies used standard time series methods that allow for no formal tests of structural breaks.
From the early 1980s, both countries underwent continuing economic liberalisation. In Australia, the mid-1980s saw financial deregulation and the Australian dollar float, while in 2000 the introduction of a goods and services tax (GST) sought to encourage savings amongst low income earners. The formation of the Australian Stock Exchange Limited in 1987 and microeconomic reforms in the manufacturing sector both boosted private investment. Similarly, a number of events also affected New Zealand's economic performance; for instance, she lost her preferential trading position with the UK in 1973, embarked on financial market deregulations in the 1980s, undertook privatisation measures during 1980s and 1990s, and experienced the Asian financial crises and climate drought in the late 1990s.
This paper fills this gap in the literature by presenting estimates of the demand for money (M1) for Australia and New Zealand over the 1960-2009 period. Structural breaks in the data series and cointegrating vectors are examined through the use of Strazicich (2003, 2004) and Hansen (1996a, 1996b) methods; naturally Felmingham and Zhang (2001) were only able to apply the latter of these two methods.
Specification and methods
Conventionally the demand for money is specified as a function of real income and the nominal interest rate, however to capture the true cost of holding money we specify the demand for money in its canonical form and its extended versions, such that:
where 0 4 Real output is constructed using nominal GDP (deflated by the GDP deflator) and the change in the GDP deflator is our proxy of the inflation rate. The 3-month deposit rate is our proxy for the nominal interest rate. Many central banks, including the Reserve Bank of Australia and Reserve Bank of New Zealand, find it relatively easy to control M1 and therefore testing for the stability of M1 demand offers useful implications on monetary policy procedures. Although either nominal or real exchange rate can be used to proxy for the cost of holding money, we have used real effective exchange rate due to data availability. Our results are based on the application of the GDP deflator to compute the inflation rate although application of the Consumer Price Index gave qualitatively similar results.
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Our explicit expectations of the sign and magnitude of the real income variable is in line with Baumol-Tobin and Quantity Theory models which predict that the income elasticity should be 0.5 and 1, respectively (Baumol, 1952; Tobin, 1956; Friedman, 1956 ). Ball (2001) pointed out that low income elasticity estimates would imply that the Friedman rule is not optimal and that the money supply should grow more sluggishly than income to attain price stability. In advanced countries, the income elasticity is expected to be much lower than unity due to improvements in and developments of financial systems. Our explicit expectations of the signs and magnitudes of cost of holding money variables (nominal interest rate, inflation rate and real effective exchange rate) are negative and small. 6 
Lee and Strazicich (2003) tests
The endogenous two-break LM unit root tests proposed by Lee and Strazicich (2003) can be explained using two models viz., model A and model C. Both models are based on alternative assumptions about structural breaks; model A allows for two shifts in the intercept and model C includes two shifts in the intercept and trend.
Model A is specified as follows: 
:
The specification and null and alternative hypotheses of model C, respectively, are: :
: See Laidler (1993a Laidler ( , 1993b , Sriram (1999) and Hoffman and Rasche (2001) Initially we allocated a maximum lag length of 8 periods and obtained the optimal lag length on the basis of the significance of the last lag. The break dates are determined where the LM test statistic is at its minimum. The critical values of this test are tabulated in Strazicich (2003, 2004) . Thus this method is more demanding than Perron (1989 Perron ( , 1997 because it offers more than one break in the series.
Gregory and Hansen tests
Unlike the Bai and Perron (2003) and Lee and Strazicich (2003) tests, Hansen's (1996a, 1996b ) (henceforth GH) method is a test for structural changes in the cointegrating vector. The null hypothesis of no cointegration with structural breaks is tested against the alternative of cointegration. GH has postulated four models that are based on alternative assumptions about structural breaks: model 1 is a level shift; model 2 is a level shift with trend; model 3 is a regime shift where both the intercept and the slope coefficients change and model 4 is a regime shift where intercept, trend and slope coefficients all change. The single break date in these models is endogenously determined. Based on equation (2) the implied specification of these four models with structural breaks, respectively, are as follows: 
where 1  is the intercept, 2  is the parameter for intercept shift, 1  is the income elasticity, 1  is the parameter for trend, 2  is the parameter for trend shift, 2  is the semirate of interest elasticity, 3  is the exchange rate elasticity, 4  is the elasticity with respect to inflation rate, 11  is the parameter for shift in income elasticity, 22  is the parameter for shift in semi-rate of interest elasticity, 33  is the parameter for shift in exchange rate elasticity and 44  is the parameter for shift in elasticity with respect to the inflation rate. A break date is selected where the absolute value of the ADF test statistic is at its maximum. The critical values for cointegration are tabulated in Hansen (1996a, 1996b) and are used for testing cointegration in the EG method with unknown breaks. 
Empirical results

Lee and Strazicich (2003) tests
Endogenous two break minimum LM unit root tests were applied to assess the order of integration of variables. Table 1 reports the results for these tests based on models A and C which represent two breaks in the intercept (model A) and two breaks in the intercept and trend (model C). The test statistics of the LM unit root tests for the five variables (real M1, real income, nominal interest rate, real effective exchange rate and inflation rate) do not exceed the critical values in absolute terms and therefore the unit root null cannot be rejected at the 5% level. The t-statistics corresponding to the break dates are statistically significant at conventional levels (not reported for brevity). Break dates are fairly consistent across models, are expected for both countries and are in line with the timings of macroeconomic events outlined above.
{Table 1 about here}
Cointegration tests
The GH method was applied to test for cointegration between the variables in canonical and extended equations of money demand (i.e. equations (1) and (2), respectively); results are provided in Table 2 . The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for canonical specification (1) in models 1 (break date [hereafter BD]: 1994) and 4 (BD: 1984) for Australia and in models 3 (BD: 1998) and 4 (BD: 1984) for New Zealand. For specification (2) , models 1 and 2 reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for Australia and the break dates are 1984 and 1997, respectively. Using the same specification, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected only in model 4 for New Zealand with a break date of 1984. These results support the existence of long run relationships of the demand for money in both countries. Explicitly, the results of the canonical form show that money demand is cointegrated with real income and the nominal interest rate; the same can be observed when the model is augmented with real effective exchange and inflation rates, as in the extended version. Break dates for both countries are consistent with those attained through the application of Lee and Strazicich's (2003) We apply the GH method based on the premise that structural breaks may have affected the cointegrating relationships of money demand in both countries. Strictly speaking, structural break tests should only be used when standard methods fail to yield robust estimates. Applications of the standard Johansen (1991 Johansen ( , 1995 method to data for the whole time period did not give meaningful results; see Table 1A and 2A in Appendix. Note that the results obtained from application of the Johansen method did reveal weak cointegration among the variables in canonical and extended equations for Australia and unexpectedly high income elasticity estimates of around 1.8 (canonical equation) and 2.1 (extended equation) for New Zealand. In light of these Johansen results, we argue that there could be structural breaks present in the M1 relationships for both countries and therefore our application of the GH method is justifiable.
Long run estimates
GH cointegrating equations were estimated with the EG method and the results are presented in Table 3 . Given a priori expectation that the income elasticity estimates should be less than unity, we can conclude that there are plausible results for Australia in model 4 (canonical specification) and model 1 (extended specification) and plausible results for New Zealand in model 4 (extended specification). The estimated coefficients in these models have expected signs and are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. For Australia, the income elasticity of money demand is around 0.64, which implies that a 1% increase in real income raises the demand for money by about 0.64%, while for New Zealand the income elasticity of money demand is around 0.68, which implies that a 1% increase in real income would raise the demand for money by about 0.68%, all ceteris paribus. 8 With these findings, we argue that the money demand relationships in Australia and New Zealand have undergone regime shifts where intercept, trend and slope coefficients have changed. Australian money demand has also undergone both intercept shift (extended specification) and regime shift (canonical specification) with the latter appearing to be dominant.
{Table 3 about here}
Sub-sample estimates
Given the presence of these obtained break dates it is prudent to examine long run elasticities of money demand for sub-sample periods. 9 The observed common break is 1984, and moreover a break in late 1990s is also present for both countries. Consequently we select two sets of sub-samples such that pre-reforms periods are 1960-1983 and 1960-1997 and post-reform periods are 1984-2009 and 1998-2009 . The break date in 1984 is not unrealistic because both countries implemented financial reforms around that time. Further, the break date in 1998 could also be justified as Australia launched unilateral trade liberalization measures and internal structural reforms during the 1990s which led 8 We disregarded the estimates of other models for both countries because they are either statistically insignificant or have implausible income elasticity magnitudes. The canonical specification failed to explain the determinants of money demand for New Zealand, leading us to prefer the extended version. to higher rates of growth of GDP and productivity. Some examples of these reforms include tariff reform and deregulation and privatization of many services sectors. Similarly the New Zealand economy was also affected by a number of economic events that took place during late 1990s, such as the 1996 and 1998 income tax reforms in, the 1997 Asian financial crises and several state enterprise privatizations.
Application of four time series methods viz., GETS, EG, FMOLS and 2SLS give consistent results for both sets of sub-samples; 10 see Table 4 and 5 for the sub-sample cointegrating equations based on canonical and extended equations, respectively. The estimated coefficients have expected signs and are significant at conventional levels. Almost without exception, the income elasticity estimates are less than unity and the estimates of nominal interest, real effective exchange and inflation rates have the expected negative signs. Following Engle and Granger (1987) we also tested for the stationarity of the resulting EG residuals for the sub-sample periods. Applications of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test show that in all cases the residuals are stationary, thereby corroborating the cointegration case. (The ADF unit root test results for the residuals are reported in Table 3A in Appendix.) A smaller number of observations for the sub-samples raises the concern for endogeneity and short sample biases, however, according to Rao (2007) if alternative time series methods give consistent cointegrating estimates then the aforementioned issues are minimal. {Table 4 about here} {Table 5 about here}
The sub-sample estimates provide useful insight on whether the financial reforms had any significant effect. If they have been effective then there should be evidence for some economies of scale in the use of M1; further the response of the demand for money to the rate of interest should improve because of a progression towards more marketbased interest rate policies and increased capital mobility. In other words and relative to the pre-reform period, the post-reform sub-samples should show a relatively lower income elasticity estimate while the absolute value of the interest rate estimate should increase.
The results in Table 4 and 5 show that income (interest rate) elasticities in both canonical and extended equations have declined (increased) in the post-reform subsamples. Further, in most cases the estimates of real effective exchange and inflation rates have increased relative to the pre-reform estimates. These observed changes in the long run elasticities seem to be slightly greater in the first set of sub-samples where the break date is 1984, and they may be illustrating that reforms have improved the financial efficiency in both countries. Also, it is likely that structural breaks may have caused some short-run instability in the money demand functions.
Short run estimates
The short run error correction models (ECM) are estimated with Hendry's GETS approach 11 with the GH cointegrating equations used to establish the ECM models. The 12 dependent variable (lnM t ) is regressed on its lagged values, the current and lagged values of explanatory variables (lnY t ), R t , lnE t and π t ) and the one period lagged residuals from the respective GH cointegrating equation. Application with a maximum of 4 period lags and further application of variable deletion tests provide parsimonious ECM models, as reported in Table 6 . Two ECM models are estimated using Australian data, based on GH models 1 and 4 and presented in columns Aus (1) and Aus (2); the results of the ECM model based on New Zealand data, which are based on GH model 4, are presented in column NZ (1).
{Table 6 about here}
The short run dynamic estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level and the lagged error correction term (ECM t-1 ) has the expected negative sign; this implies a negative feedback mechanism which suggests that if there are departures from equilibrium in the previous period then this departure is reduced in the current period by about 21-25% for Australia and by about 11% for New Zealand.
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Stability tests
Finally, we assessed the stability of M1 demand functions using the Aus (2) and NZ (1) estimated equations for whole-and sub-sample periods through application of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ and Nyblom (1989) type tests, as suggested in Bruggeman et al. (2003) ; note that the results of the stability tests for equation Aus (1) gave qualitatively similar results. To conserve space, we report only the CUSUMSQ (as shown in Figures 1 to 4) and Nyblom (Table 7) tests results for 1984-1998 and 1998-2009 sub-periods . The Nyblom test proposed by Bruggeman et al. (2003) uses score functions directly rather than their first order Taylor expansions. These scores are computed for maximum (supremum) and average (mean) values over the period of analysis and we denote these tests as () The results of CUSUMSQ and Nyblom stability tests illustrate that M1 demand functions were unstable in both countries over the 1984-1998 period, which may imply that the 1980s reforms did have a significant impact on the demand for money in both countries. However, this impact on stability was temporary, as stability of M1 demand is not rejected after 1998. Further, M1 stability is not rejected in the whole-sample period.
The observed instability in money demand functions for both countries during the 1984-1998 period implies that it would have been appropriate monetary policy stance for 12 The χ 2 statistics indicate that there are no diagnostic test issues associated with serial correlation (χ their central banks to target the rate of interest. However, there is lack of evidence to support instability in the money demand functions after 1998, and therefore it would not be unreasonable if these central banks chose to switch policies and target the money supply as their instrument of monetary policy.
As emphasized by Poole (1970) , the money supply (rate of interest) should be targeted if money demand is stable (unstable) and targeting the rate of interest when money demand is stable will accentuate instability in income. Under these circumstances, monetary targeting was the feasible policy stance for both countries.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the demand for real narrow money (M1) for Australia and New Zealand over the 1960-2009 period. Two specifications were considered: the canonical form and its extended form through augmentations of real effective exchange and inflation rates to capture the costs of holding money. Both specifications performed well for Australia but only the augmented version was plausible for New Zealand. The application of Lee and Strazicich's (2003) endogenous two break minimum LM unit root tests reveal that the variables (real M1, real income, nominal interest rate, real effective exchange rate and inflation rate) are I(1) in levels.
Application of Gregory and Hansen's method revealed that the cointegrating relationships of money demand underwent intercept and regime shifts in Australia and a regime shift in New Zealand. The results suggest a common break date of 1984; a break in the late 1990s was also present for both countries. Since the early 1980s both countries underwent continuing economic liberalisation and the early break date may be capturing the circumstances of financial reforms. Estimates for the entire period reveal income elasticity estimates of around 0.64 and 0.68 for Australia and New Zealand, respectively, and the demand for money responds negatively to variations in the nominal rate of interest, and real effective exchange and inflation rates, albeit by small amounts.
Application of four time series methods viz., GETS, EG, FMOLS and 2SLS gave consistent results for two sets of sub-samples with 1984 and 1998 break dates. The income (interest rate) elasticities in both canonical and extended equations declined (increased) in the post-reform sub-samples. This illustrates improvements in the financial system around the break dates that are closely associated with the financial reforms.
Stability tests showed that money demand functions were unstable in the period 1984-1998 for both countries. The structural changes around 1984 did have a significant though temporary impact on the demand for money as the stability of M1 demand is not rejected after 1998. These findings imply that it would not have been unreasonable for their central banks to use the rate of interest as an instrument of monetary policy during the period of instability and, following Poole (1970) , monetary targeting when the money demand is stable.
Future research could examine the nature of financial reforms and their individual impacts on the demand for money. Given that a number of reforms have been implemented since the 1980s along with a number of other important events, it would be useful to analyze their impacts more specifically. Further research could use structural break tests to examine the stability of broad money for both countries. 3.190 -3.190 -3.190 -3.603 No No No Yes Significance at 5% and 10% levels is indicated by * and **, respectively. C and T denote intercept and trend, respectively. Dummy variables are created using the break dates; for example, in canonical specification model 1 for Australia the break date is 1994 therefore dummy is unity after 1994. 
